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Affect-dependent Recall
The strength of a memory is influenced by the 
conditions in which it is formed and recalled. A special 
case of this situation is state-dependent memory. A state- 
dependent memory is one that is recalled better when the 
conditions at recall match those at memory formation. A 
state can be created by the immediate surroundings, drugs, 
alcohol, or mood. State-dependent recall is known by 
different names, describing the means of state induction.
Both context-dependent and state-dependent recall have 
been observed in humans and animals (Smith, Glenberg, and 
Bjork, 1978, Perkins and Weyant, 1958, Hill, Schwin, Powell, 
and Goodwin, 1973, Bliss, 1973). In addition affect- or 
mood-state-dependent recall has been observed in humans 
(Bower, 1981), but affect-dependent recal has yet to be 
observed in animals. If context-dependent, state-deperdent, 
and affect-dependent recall are all manifestations of the 
same phenomenon, then affect-dependent recall should be 
observable in animals.
The question of affect dependent memory in animals was 
addressed in the context of a social memory situation.
Adult male rats are placed in an arena with juvenile male 
rats in a first exposure, during which the adult's 
investigation of the juvenile is recorded. The rat's mood 
or affect was manipulated through associations to two
different arenas, one which was safe and one unsafe.
A high level of training or overtraining has been 
observed to influence state-dependent memory (Bliss 1972). 
Therefore, when attempting to observe a state-dependent 
memory of any kind, the level of "training" or the amount of 
practice the subject is allowed is very important, because 
there must be sufficient variability in the measure (e.g. no 
ceiling or floor effect) such that it would be possible to 
measure a change if it exists. The two empirical questions 
addressed in this paper are: 1) At what first exposure 
length is there sufficient variability in the social memory 
task to be able to observe any later change? 2) Given this 
variability observed with a particular exposure, is it 
possible to observe affect-dependent recall in rats with 
this social memory task?
Varying first exposure length has a significant effect 
on investigation in the second exposure in test trials, 
where the same juvenile is used as in the first exposure, 
but not in control trials, where a different juvenile is 
used in the two exposures. The amount of investigation in 
the second exposure was not significantly influenced by the 
matching or non-matching of the arenas between the first and 
second exposures.
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1INTRODUCTION
The strength of a memory Is influenced by the conditions in 
which it is formed and recalled. An example of this effect is 
state-dependent memory, a kind of memory that is recalled better 
when the conditions at recall match those at memory formation. A 
state can be created by the immediate surroundings, various drugs, 
or the subject's mood. State-dependent memory or recall is known 
by different names, which are descriptive of the agents of state 
induction (Eich, 1980).
In this paper I will make a distinction between state- 
dependent memory, drug-state-dependent memory, context-dependent 
memory, and affect-dependent memory. These four categories will 
be designated as follows: "state-dependent refers to the genoral 
phenomenon, with no emphasis placed on the specific kind of state 
being discussed; "drug-state-dependent" refers to the state- 
dependent effect observed when a drug's dose is varied; "context- 
dependent" refers to the state-dependent effect observed when 
environmental stimuli are manipulated; "affect-dependent" refers 
to the state-dependent effect observed when the subject's mood or 
affect is varied.
Context-dependent memory, drug-state-dependent memory, and 
affect-dependent memory, while all caused by different agents, 
could be considered different facets of the same phenomenon.
The three phenomenon react in the same manner to a number of 
different manipulations. The features of state-dependent memory
2suggest that the states are used as retrieval cues only after 
several other possible types of retrieval cues have been discarded 
as useless in that situation.
In this paper I will examine the principle features of 
context-dependent memory and drug-state-dependent memory. The 
features of affect-dependent memory will be reviewed in greater 
depth, and an experiment examining the possible existence of 
affect-dependent recall in animals will be reported.
Context-Dependent Recall
If recall in a memory test is poorer when the testing 
environment differs from the training environment, the memory is 
context-dependent. In this paper "context" is a class of stimuli 
whose properties do not change the overt qualities of the test, 
the task requirements, but the changing of which alters the 
testing environment. Changing the testing environment frequently 
influences the subject's performance. Whether changing the 
context influences just performance or the actual recall of 
information is an important distinction.
One example of a context-dependent memory in animals is the 
straight alley performance of rats. Changing the color of a 
straight alley in which rats have been trained to run to obtain 
food increases running time (Perkins and Weyant, 1958). In this 
experiment the animal's running time is indicative of its memory 
for the task, because as an animal gains more experience with the 
task, latency to run to the end of the alley decreases. An
3increased running time in comparison to previous trials is 
interpreted as a decreased memory for the task (Perkins and 
Weyant, 1958). The color of the alley is contextual information 
and not part of the nominal task requirements. Where is the line 
drawn between requirements of the task and the context of the 
testing situation? These are not easy questions to answer. To 
the rat the color of the alley is apparently of some importance. 
One possible interpretation is that when the color of the alley is 
changed, the rat does not seem to remember the task as well. An 
alternative explanation is the rat remembers the behavior required 
to obtain the food, but the changing of the color of the alley 
reduces his level of performance, not the accuracy of his recall.
Two important experiments that examine the context-dependent 
effect in humans are : 1) a word list learning task where the two 
environments are under water and on dry land (Godden and Baddeley, 
1975); 2) a word list learning task where the two environments or 
contexts were two different rooms in the same building (Smith, 
Glenberg, and Bjork, 1978). In the first experiment the subjects 
were deep sea divers who were asked to learn a word list either 
while on dry land or while under water. The subjects were later 
tested for their recall of the word lists either in the same 
environment where they learned the lists, or in the other 
environment. When the testing and training context were the same, 
recall was better than when the contexts were different. This
1effect was observed regardless of which environment was the 
training environment (Godden and Baddeley, 1975). In the 
experiment by Smith, Glenberg, and Bjork (1978), the different 
contexts were much more commonplace; they were two different rooms 
in the same building. Despite these more common environments, the 
results were comparable to those obtained by Godden and Baddeley 
(1975). When the rooms for testing and training were the same, 
the subject's recall was better than when the rooms were 
different. This is the context-dependent effect.
Elements of the training situation that are not directly 
relevant to the task are being remembered, and changing these 
elements influences the subject sufficiently to impair 
performance. One question that could be asked is whether the 
subjects, humans and animals, are remembering all the elements of 
the training situation. If this were the case it would seem to be 
a very inefficient way of learning. If every detail is not being 
stored, then what makes a detail important enough to be stored in 
any given situation and later used as a retrieval cue?
Drug-State-Dependent Recall
The design for an experiment to test the state-dependent 
manipulation generally involves five stages: 1) state induction, 
2)training, 3)retention interval, 4)state induction and 5)testing. 
The state is created in the subject. While in this state the 
subject is trained on seme sort of task or given a list of items
5to learn. Following an intervening period either the same state 
or a different state is induced in the subject, after which he or 
she is tested on the task he or she learned in the training stage. 
A comparison of the subject's memory between matched and unmatched 
states is made to see if the methods influenced memory in a state- 
dependent manner.
Various substances ( e.g. alcohol and pentobarbital) induce 
drug-state-dependent effects on memory in various animals. The 
test subjects have included people, monkeys and rats.
A drug-state-dependent effect with alcohol was observed by 
Overton (1972), Miller, Adesso, Fleming, Gino, and Lauerman 
(1978), and Peterson (1977), among others. In each of these 
studies, the state-dependent effect was observed in non-cued 
recall tasks, but not in cued recall tasks, either with alcohol 
(Peterson, 1977) or with marijuana (Eich, Weingartner, Stillman, 
and Gill in, 1975). In a cued recall task the experimenter 
provides the subject with a "cue" or hint as to what the subject 
is to recall. For example, if the subject learned 3 lists of 
words, one which was of inanimate objects, one which was of state 
capitals, and one which was of famous people, and when he or she 
is asked to recall the lists the experimenter would prompt the 
subject with which noun class they are to recall. In a non-cued 
recall task the subject would just be asked to recall as many of 
the items from the lists as possible.
6In these studies the greatest impairment to memory occurred 
when the training states did not match testing states.
A matching of intoxicated states or sober states at training and 
testing results in better recall than if the subject is either 
sober at training and intoxicated at testing or vice versa.
In addition to these drugs, pentobarbital administration 
influences memory in a state-dependent manner (Bliss, 1973). 
Drug-state-dependent recall is not observed each time the drug is 
administered. The disruption of recall is inversely related to 
how well drug dosage levels match between testing and training 
states (Bliss, 1973).
Not every attempt to reproduce this effect of state- 
dependent recall has met with success. One instance in which no 
evidence of the effect was observed was in a study by Bliss in 
1973 with pentobarbital in monkeys. He attributes his failure in 
replication to an overtraining effect. Bliss used a color 
discrimination task in monkeys. In an experiment in which the 
state-dependent effect was observed, the monkeys were never 
exposed to the same discrimination twice. In the experiment in 
which no state-dependent effect was observed, the monkeys were 
exposed to the individual discrimination pairs more than once in 
training. As a result, the animals that did not show a state- 
dependent effect had more experience or training with the material 
to be remembered than the animals that did show the state- 
dependent effect (Bliss, 1972). A high level of training will
7cause a memory to be impervious to the effects of a change in 
states (Bliss, 1972).
Another failure to produce the effect was by Miller,
Adesso, Fleming, Gino and Lauerman (1978). In this experiment 
word lists were learned by subjects while in either an intoxicated 
or sober condition. No state-dependent effect was observed. The 
failure at replication could also be attributed to an overtraining 
effect. The design of the experiment called for an immediate test 
of free recall after the training session.
This testing of knowledge of the word list may have strengthened 
the memory of the subjects, making it more resistant to any 
impediment that a change in drug state can cause.
State-dependent memory is observed with various drugs, but 
only under certain conditions. Memories of a non-cued variety are 
subject to the state-dependent effect, while cued recall does not 
show the effects of these drugs. A high level of training or 
overtraining will also mask the drug-state-dependent effect, 
because the context of the memory task for an overtrained memory 
may act as the necessary retrieval cues.
One possible explanation for the existence of the state- 
dependent effect is: in the absence of either retrieval cues or a 
memory for an overtrained task, which requires no augmentation to 
be retrieved, the brain must rely on what information is at hand 
to choose the appropriate information for retrieval. The
8surrounding and/or drug effects could be "drafted into service" as 
retrieval cues in the absence of any other cues.
Affect-Dependent Recall
Mood or affect has effects similar to various drugs or 
context on memory. The same mood at training and testing 
sometimes results in better recall than a different mood at 
training and testing (e.g. Bower, 1981, Bartlett and Santrock, 
1977, Leight and Ellis, 1981). There have, however, been failures 
to replicate some of these findings (e,g. Bower and Mayer, 1985).
The range of subjects who have shown affect-dependent memory 
includes preschool children, college students, the easily 
hypnotized, and diagnosed affective disorder patients. In most 
subjects, the mood or affect must be induced. No mood induction 
is used in victims of affective disorders; instead, the naturally 
occurring mood shifts are utilized to compare mood state effects.
A mood induction procedure is analogous to the administration 
of a drug. There are a number of different types of mood 
induction procedures. The means of induction include the reading 
of self-referent phrases, e.g. the Velten Induction procedure 
(Velten, 1968), the reading of affectively biased prose passages ( 
e.g. Bartlett and Santrock, 1977), and hypnosis (Bower, 1981).
Affect-Dependent Memory in Children
Two studies have examined affect-dependent memory in 
children. They are not the earliest studies to examine the 
phenomenon, but they are among the first to study the effect in an
9"ordinary population" (Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock, 1982). 
Both studies found an affect-dependent effect in free recall 
tasks, but not in cued recall (Bartlett and Santrock, 1979; 
Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock, 1982). (That affect-dependent 
recall is observed in free recall situations and not cued recall 
situations is not surprising if affect-dependent memory is a 
"subclass" of state-dependent memory.) Moods were induced in both 
studies through the reading of affectively valenced prose passages 
to children by experimenters. These two studies provide strong 
evidence for the existence of affect-dependence. Part of the 
strength of this evidence stems from the failure of the mood 
induction technique to produce the state when it was preceded by a 
relaxation process (Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock, 1982). The 
authors explained this failure to show affect-dependence through 
an application of the two factor theory of emotion. In agreement 
with Mandler (1975), they argued that the perception of an emotion 
is possible only if there is the appropriate autonomic arousal.
The cognitive component of the emotion was not enough, by Itself, 
to influence memory in their test. When the cognitive state set 
up by the induction was accompanied by the corresponding induced 
autonomic arousal, there was an effect in the memory test.
Arousal cues and arousal state significantly influence affect- 
dependent recall (Clark, Milberg, and Ross, 1983). These two 
studies, one showing that blocking autonomic arousal cues masks or 
eliminates affect-dependent memory (Bartlett, Burleson, and
10
Santrock, 1983), and the other showing that an arousal-state- 
dependent effect is observable (Clark, Milberg, and Ross, 1983), 
suggest that the distinctive states necessary for the 
manifestation of state-dependent recall must have components that 
are not just cognitive in nature.
Affect-Dependent Memory in Clinical Populations 
Affective disorder patients are good subjects for the study 
of affect-dependent memory because their "natural" mood swings can 
be used to test across affective states. Calev and Erwin (1985) 
made use of these fluctuations to test for the presence of affect- 
dependent recall in a clinical population of unipolar depressives. 
In affective disorder patients, one deviance from normalcy is a 
low level of item clustering in free recall (Calev and Erwin, 
1985). Perhaps because they fail to cluster elements in free 
recall, depressives show a deficit in accuracy of free recall, but 
not in recognition memory, in comparison to normal controls (Calev 
and Erwin, 1985). This deficit in memory is not due to lower IQ. 
The mean subject IQ was not subnormal (Calev and Erwin, 1985).
This deficit in free recall parallels a pattern of affect 
influencing free recall in a state-dependent manner. A possible 
explanation for the deficits induced in affect-dependent memory 
may be that different moods lend to different clustering 
strategies. A deficit in non-matching mood states may be due to 
inaccessibility of certain clusters or parts of clusters that may
11
have been encoded. The evidence from this abnormal population may 
be a clue as to what is occurring in state-dependent memories.
Manic-depressives show deficient recall of self-created 
associations if they are asked to recall these associations while 
in an affective state that does not match the state in which the 
associations were created (Henry, Weingartner, and Murphy, 1973, 
and Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy, 1977). In both studies the 
natural mood swings of the patients were used instead of imposing 
moods on the patients. While these studies show strong evidence 
for affect-dependent memory, they lack a certain amount of 
generalizability to “normal” populations because of the unusual 
intensity of the affective states associated with the illness 
(Weingartner et al., 1977). In addition to the possible strength 
of the mood experienced in an affective disorder, the states may 
not parallel other qualities of mood states in the general 
population. One possible area of dissimilarity could be in the 
quality of the moods experienced. The patients moods may be more 
"pure.” What they feel may only be one mood, whereas the "normal" 
person would feel a mixture of similar emotions all at once.
Pol ivy (1981) observed that in mood induction procedures one mood 
is rarely exclusively induced; rather, several related mood states 
are induced.
The idea that one mood would evoke or at least increase the 
likelihood of related emotions being elicited is incorporated in 
the Bower's network theory of memory:
12
Network Hypothesis:
Each distinct emotion has a specific node in memory 
that collects together many other aspects of 
the emotion that are connected to it by associative 
pointers. Each node is linked with propositions 
describing events from one’s life during which that 
emotion was aroused. These nodes can be activated 
by many stimuli. Activation of that node produces 
the autonomic arousal and behavior usually 
associated with that emotion. Activation is also 
spread to memory nodes associated with that mood, 
creating subthreshold excitation at these nodes.
Thus, a weak memory that partially describes an 
event may combine with activation from an emotion 
unit to raise the total activation of the relevant 
memory above a threshold of consciousness. (Bower,
1981).
One implication of the network theory which can be drawn in 
an affect-dependent paradigm is emotions eliciting similar 
autonomic arousals should not cause as large a recall deficit as 
dissimilar emotions because these similar emotions would have 
overlapping qualities, and, by inference, overlapping nodes in the 
network. The idea that emotions are not discrete entities, but 
occur on a continuum with overlapping qualities, was proposed by 
Plutchik (1980). He suggested that emotions exist on a circular 
continuum much like a color wheel, with many moods being the 
composites of eight primary emotions. These primary emotions are 
analogous to the primary colors, of which all other colors are 
comprised (Bower, 1981). Thompson attempted to test Plutchik1 s 
hypothesis (reported in Bower, 1981). In the experiment, Thompson 
hypnotically induced four different moods in the subjects during 
training sessions. While in each of these different moods, the 
subject learned a different word \ \ % % . Thompson later tested word
13
list recall across all emotions, crossing moods in a 4x4 design. 
Word list recall was best in matching mood states and worst in 
mood states predicted by Plutchik to be direct opposites on his 
emotion circle. Emotions that were ninety degrees from the 
training emotion showed levels of forgetting approximately halfway 
between complete matching mood states and complete non-matching 
mood states (Bower, 1981). The idea of the emotion circle and the 
data that Bower reported support the network hypothesis, wherein 
emotion has a pointer effect, but in addition it has many 
secondary effects. These secondary effects of emotions overlap 
and point to each other, making an affective state not a pure 
clear cut condition, but a mixture of various subsidiary 
influences. The implications of this overlapping affect for 
affect-dependent recall are that material learned in one mood will 
be accessible from not only the original mood, but also from moods 
similar to the mood at learning.
Affect-Dependent Memory in Adults 
Affect-dependent memory has also been observed in “normal" 
adults. The induction methods used experimentally to elicit the 
phenomenon of affect-dependent recall include facial mimicry, 
the reading of affectively valenced prose passages, Velten mood 
induction procedures, and hypnosis. In the Velten mood induction 
procedure the subjects read 60 self-referent statements that have 
an elated, depressed, or neutral affect (Velten, 1968).
The reading of these passages will supposedly induce an affect 
because the thoughts of the subjects will influence their emotions 
(Buchwald et al., 1981).
The phenomenon of affect-dependent memory has not appeared in 
every attempted replication. On at least two occasions the 
researchers did not observe the effect on their first two attempts 
and had to use an interference paradigm to produce the effect 
(Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro, 1981, and Schare, Lisman, and 
Spear, 1984). An interfering task is not always necessary to 
observe affect-dependent recall. The effect was observed by 
Leight and Ellis (1981) without the use of interference 
paradigm. They used the Velten mood induction procedure and 
tested the recall of a list of trigram doublets (e.g. BONKID or 
BAMPAC). The effectiveness of the mood induction was checked 
through the use of a Depression Adjective Checklist (DACL). The 
DACL is a commonly used method to test the mood a subject is 
experiencing. The test requires the person to check all the words 
on a provided list that describe their present feelings (Leight 
and Ellis, 1981). The list contains both positive and negative 
adjectives, so as to measure both positive and negative affect.
The measures taken through the DACL correlated with the induced 
mood (Leight and Ellis, 1981). The experimenters ran two 
replications of their study and on both occasions observed an 
affect-dependent influence on memory in a delayed recall task.
The delay for the recall task was twenty-four hours.
Manipulation of facial expression as a means of mood 
induction is effective in producing affect-dependent recall 
(Laird, Wagener, Halal, and Szegda, 1982). This experiment 
however, has a confound. The experiment crosses the potential 
effects of affect-dependence with a similar phenomenon called mood 
congruence. Considered by some to be a specialized subset of 
affect-dependent memory, mood congruence is the better recall of 
affectively valenced material either read or experienced when the 
subject is in a mood during the recall session that matches the 
mood of the to be remembered material (Blaney, 1986). Mood 
congruence is thought to be a subset of affect-dependence because 
the original experience puts the subject in the same mood as the 
valence of the situation. The subject is considered to be in that 
mood state. The recall of the experience is then affect- 
dependent because there are two mood states involved; the mood at 
encoding, which supposedly matches the affect of the event or 
material, and the mood at recall, which has been induced to match 
the memorial mood. Laird et al. (1982) crossed mood congruence 
and affect-dependence because they induced one mood in the 
subjects and then had them read a prose passage which had an 
affective valence of its own, which may or may not have matched 
the mood that had been previously induced. By crossing the 
induced affect and the written affect, they observed an effect 
which was not only mood congruent, but also affect-dependent. The 
subjects remembered material best from the prose articles not only
16
when recall mood matched the mood induced before reading the 
article, the affect-dependent portion of their results, but also 
when the valence of the prose passage matched the mood of the 
reading and recall states of the experiment, the mood congruence 
effect (Laird et al., 1982). These results should be viewed as a 
combination of two related phenomena, affect-dependent recall and 
mood congruence.
A similar effect was observed in an experiment by Gage and 
Safer (1985). They looked at recognition differences for 
emotional faces between the two hemispheres of the human brain. 
They also crossed mood congruence and affect-dependence. They 
presented facial expressions to each hemisphere separately while 
the subject was experiencing a specific mood. The affect- 
dependence component of the task is the mood-state of the subject, 
and the mood congruence here is the emotion expressed by the 
stimulus face, which either matched or crossed with the mood 
induced in the subject. After a short time the subjects had a 
mood reinduced and were then tested in each hemisphere for 
recognition of the facial stimuli. In the right hemisphere there 
was a strong influence of not only the affect of the stimulus, but 
also of the affect experienced by the subject at time of recall. 
There was very little influence of affect of either stimulus face 
or of the subject observed in the left hemisphere (Gage and Safer, 
1985). From this evidence it might seem that it is the right 
hemisphere that is involved in affect-dependence, but not the left
17
hemisphere. Further work examining more moods and other tasks 
divided between hemispheres is needed to answer the question as to 
whether both or just one hemisphere demonstrate affect-dependent 
recall.
Not every attempt to observe affect-dependent recall has been 
successful. There are two studies which seriously questioned the 
existence of affect-dependence, because the effect was only 
observed after the experimenters used an interference task. The 
first study was by Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro, (1978), the 
second was by Schare, Lisman, and Spear, (1984). An interference 
task is an activity that occupies the subject with a memory task 
which has properties very similar to the original to be remembered 
material is an "interfering" activity. The purpose of this 
exercise is to conflict with, or "interfere" with the formation, 
maintenance or recall of the original memory. In both experiments 
the subjects were tested on their free recall of a list of words 
they had learned in the training session. The Bower et al. (1978) 
study used hypnosis as a means of induction and the Schare et 
al.(1984) study used the Velten method for mood induction. In the 
first attempts of both groups, the retention interval was very 
short, less than an hour. This short duration may partially 
account for the lack of observed affect-dependence. The training 
session may have been recent enough and unique enough for the 
subjects that they required no other cues to remind them of the 
words to be recalled. In the second stage of their experiments,
18
the retention interval was lengthened to twenty-four hours because 
the level of recall over a short period of time may have been too 
high to show any shifts in recall (Bower, 1981). Both the Bower 
et al. (1978) study and the Schare et al. (1978) study did not 
observe any shift in recall accuracy due to the increased 
retention interval. The contextual cues of being in a psychology 
experiment and trying to remember a word list that the subjects 
had learned yesterday were probably strong enough clues for the 
subject to be able to "find" all the information that was desired. 
Another way of looking at the circumstances would be to say that 
the context of the experiment was so unique that no other cues 
were necessary to retrieve the desired information. The context 
was unique because, at first, the subjects were only asked to 
learn one list of ,'ords. In addition to the unique context 
facilitating high recall the subjects were allowed a great deal of 
time to learn each word on the list. This could create a 
situation comparable to the one observed by Overton in monkeys, an 
effect of overtraining (1964). In the Schare et al. (1984) 
experiment the subjects were allowed eight seconds per word on a 
thirty word list. In the Bower et al. (1978) experiment the 
sixteen words on the list were read twice to the subject, on every 
five seconds and the subject was then required to orally recall 
the list. Either of these situations may have been enough for the 
subject to become “overtrained" on the word list.
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The subjects were not only highly trained on the task, but 
also the context of learning a list was unique. Between these two 
factors the subjects may have had no need for additional cues, 
such as the context, drug-state or affective-state, to recall the 
list very accurately. Interfering stimuli (another list of words) 
were used to mask these effects in both experiments. The subjects 
were given two lists to learn and then were tested after a twenty- 
four hour retention interval (Bower et al., "978, and Schare et 
al., 1984). The interpolation of the extra word list reduces the 
effectiveness of the context of a psychological experiment as a 
retrieval cue. The interfering list creates a need for additional 
cues to retrieve the desired material.
The effects of overtraining could mask any influence affect- 
dependence has on recall. Overtraining may cause a ceiling effect 
on forgetting over intervals as long as two to three days, as was 
the case in the experiment by Wetzler (1985). The material may 
have been so well learned that the measures used were insensitive 
to any influence of the mood manipulations may have had. An 
effect similar to the overtraining effect observed by Bliss may 
have been created because of the procedures used for list 
learning. On both the first day and second days of the experiment 
the subjects received a list of twenty words to which they were to 
generate free associations. They were allowed ten seconds per 
word for this task (Wetzler, 1985). The time period allowed seems 
more than sufficient for the subjects to learn the word lists.
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The addition of an active thought process which seems quite 
comparable to rehearsal would intensify any memory of the words.
The subject is forced to use an efficient mnemonic technique. By 
thrusting this mnemonic technique on the subject, Wetzler may have 
produced an overtraining effect. On the third day the subjects 
were tested on their recall of their free associations, which are 
likely to bring the original words to mind almost as if the task 
were a cued recall task, which is subject to the state-dependent 
effect (Eich, 1980), instead of a free recall task which is 
subject to the state-dependent effect (Eich, 1980). While affect- 
dependent memory is not a phenomenon that appears every time 
someone looks for it, these failures are frequently due to 
explainable problems in the methods if you are trying to observe 
the state-dependent effect. The design of the experiment seems to 
predispose the subject to a very strong learning of the word lists 
and in the testing phase provides a situation similar to cued 
recall. This would cause an encoding that would be very 
accessible to retrieval because of its many "node*1 connections and 
then the conditions at testing provide cues as to at which "nodes" 
to find the material.
An overtraining effect may also be partially responsible for 
the failure of Bower and Mayer (1985) to replicate the earlier 
work of Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1981). Hypnosis was used to 
induce the mood in the later experiment and this may partially 
account for some of the failure of replication. If there is an
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overtraining effect in this experiment it does not result from the 
length of time the subjects had for the study of the word lists. 
Immediate oral recall was required of the subjects (Bower and 
Mayer, 1985). An immediate recall of the list may be enough to 
cause the subjects to be overtrained on the task. If the memory 
of the list is strong, then there is no need to access the 
affective pointers to the item because it has already been 
retrieved through the use of another cue. If a list does not 
exist as a strong memory, affective, state, or contextual pointers 
may be necessary to discriminate between the otherwise ambiguous 
choices.
Two possible reasons for failure were noted by Bower and 
Mayer (1985). One of the reasons may have been a difference in 
interfering capabilities of interpolated tasks between testing and 
training sessions. Another possibility is the quality of the 
hypnotic state may have been inadequate, or it may not have been 
maintained by the subject (Bower and Mayer, 1985). Another 
possible confound is the experience of the subject with hypnosis. 
If the state is relatively distinctive, any seemingly slight 
manipulation induced while in the hypnotic state may seem trivial 
when compared with possibly distinctive feelings of the hypnotic 
trance.
Summary of Affect-dependence
Affect-dependent memory has been observed in several 
different populations: in children (Bartlett and Santrock, 1979,
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and Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock, 1982), in people with 
affective disorders (e.g. Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy, 1977), 
and in adults (e.g. Bower et al, 1978). Affect appears to act in 
a state-dependent manner on certain types of memory (e.g Bower and 
Mayer, 1985, and Wetzler, 1985). The situations where affect- 
dependent recall is observed are similar to the situations where 
drug state-dependent recall is seen. State-dependent memory is 
observed when the task at hand provides insufficient cues for 
retrieval either because the task situation itself is a strong 
cue, as may be the case in overtraining, or because cues are 
provided. These situations in affect-dependent recall have been 
observed when the testing and training states are not distinctive 
(Bower, 1981), or when overtraining of the testable material has 
created a ceiling or floor effect. Either of these two variables 
could account for all or nearly all failures of replication of 
affect-dependent memories.
Overview
It is possible that context-dependent recall, state- 
dependent recall, and affect-dependent recall are all different 
facets of the same phenomenon. The basic conditions under which 
they occur are quite similar. When the testing conditions differ 
from the training conditions, there is a decrement in performance 
when compared to the times the testing conditions match the 
training conditions. Altering the external environment, such as 
changing rooms, may manipulate memorial markers similar to those
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that alcohol, marijuana or various affects may influence. The 
influence of these manipulations depends on the strength of the 
tested memory. The strength of the memory is dependent on how 
well the material was learned and how unique the material is to 
the subject. A completely unique memory would be recalled much 
more easily without the aid of associative pointers in the 
subject's network than would a memory of material that is common 
and only distinguishable by the extra associative pointers. 
Pointers of mood, drug states, or training environment would aid 
in separating each instance of list learning into a unique 
experi ence.
These three influences on memory seem to operate through the 
same means. They follow the same patterns of influence; they are 
virtually the same with one exception; context-dependent and 
state-dependent memory are observed in both humans and animals, 
yet affect-dependence has been observed only in humans. If these 
three phenomena are different facets of the same qualities of 
memory, then affect-dependent recall should be observable in 
animals, following the same patterns that state- and context- 
dependent recall follow in animals. The patterns include 
attenuation by high training levels, by cuing at recall or by a 
high level of individuality of the training situation. Each of 
these should eliminate the affect-dependent effect in animals if 
it exists. The first step is to observe affect-dependent recall
in animals.
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Memory Tasks
A task for the study of affect-dependent recall should test a 
memory that persists for at least several minutes, not seconds.
The duration of the memory is important for two reasons. The 
first is that memories in humans are frequently measured in 
minutes or hours. If this task is to be useful as an animal model 
of affect-dependent recall, its properties should match human long 
term memory as much as possible. Many common tests of memory in 
animals that do not already have an affective valence ( e.g. 
avoidance behavior ) have durations measured in seconds. In 
dolphins the memory does not persist longer than 200 seconds 
(Honig and Thompson, 1982). A test of something that is less than 
three minutes long is an inadequate model for memories that last 
hours and days. A second reason a memory of relatively long 
duration is required is because of the time necessary for mood 
induction. The time it would take to change the animal's affect 
would be longer than the duration of such a memory being assessed.
A useful memory task was developed by Thor and Holloway 
(1982). The task tests the memory of an adult male rat for a 
juvenile mala rat. In preliminary work, Thor and Holloway exposed 
adult rats to juveniles in two exposures. These exposures were 
separated by an interexposure interval, the length of which varied 
between trials. They measured the adult's investigation of the 
juvenile in the second exposure. When the same adult saw the same
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juvenile In both exposures, investigation increased as the 
interexposure interval increased (Thor and Holloway, 1982). When 
the adult was exposed to a different juvenile in the second 
exposure, investigation in the second expo. did not differ 
significantly from that in the first exposure (Thor and Holloway, 
1982). The reduction in investigation during the second exposure 
is not due to either fatigue or boredom experienced by the adult 
during the second exposure. If the adult were tired or bored, 
then there would be no difference in investigation whether the 
same juvenile or a different juvenile were used in the second 
exposure. The adult is able to discriminate between two similar 
stimuli (Thor and Holloway, 1982). This is a task in which the 
animal engages with no prior training. In addition the influence 
of the memory is observable up to 40 minutes after the first 
exposure (Thor and Holloway, 1982). The adult's memory for the 
juvenile was tested across interexposure intervals that varied 
from 10 minutes to 80 minutes. In the test trials, when the adult 
saw the same juvenile twice, the amount of investigation in the 
second exposure increased with increased interexposure duration 
(Thor and Holloway, 1982). These results suggest that the longer 
the retention interval, the poorer the adult's memory of the 
juvenile is. This, then, is a memory test that requires little 
training and has a duration longer than a few minutes. This test 
therefore should provide for the study of affect-dependent recall-
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EXPERIMENT 1
Interference and training level are two factors that 
influence other tests of memory. This test of social memory has 
been observed by Thor and Holloway in 1982 to be influenced by an 
interfering stimulus in the form of a “noise juvenile'*. A “noise 
juvenile" is a third juvenile inserted during the interexposure 
interval. The "noise" juvenile is there only to act as an 
interfering stimulus.
My first experiment examined the effects of varying first 
exposure length. After I had determined the influence of exposure 
length on this memory, I ran a second experiment to attempt to 
observe affect dependent recall in animals.
Method
Subjects
The subject animals were two groups of six male Long Evans 
rats between 60 and 70 days of age. The subject animals were 
singly housed in clear plastic tubs (20cm x 20cm x 45cm). The 
stimulus animals were two groups of six juvenile male Long Evans 
rats between 20 and 25 days of age housed in sibling pairs in the 
same type of cages as the adults. All tests were conducted in the 
adult's home cage.
Apparatus
The testing was done in the adults home cage under 
fluorescent lighting. Behavior was scored using an IBM AT and the 
multi-channel event recorder program, Evintlog.
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Proct-uure
Each trial was divided into three stages. These three stages 
were: 1) the first exposure, which was 3, 5, or 7 minutes long; 2) 
the interexposure interval, winch lasted twenty minutes; and 3) 
the second exposure, which was 5 minutes long. Investigation of 
the juvenile by the adult was recorded during both exposures. 
Investigation was scored as the sniffing, following, nosing, or 
grooming of the juvenile by the adult, while the adult's nose was 
within 2 cm of the juvenile.
In each memory test trial, the juveniles and the adults were 
brought into the observation room and allowed to become accustomed 
to the new room for five minutes. A tone marked the end of the 
first five minutes, and a juvenile was then removed from its home 
cage and placed in the adult's cage. Investigation of the 
juvenile by the adult was scored. At the end of the specified 
first exposure the juvenile was returned to its home cage. After 
the end of the interexposure interval, the same juvenile was 
returned to the adult's cage and investigation was again scored.
In a control trial the procedure was the same, except for the 
juveniles used. The cagemate of the juvenile used in the first 
exposure was substituted for the original in the second exposure.
Each adult received a series consisting of three trials, each 
with a different first exposure length. Two animals were tested 
with each of the six different possible order combinations of 
trials. No adult was ever exposed to the same juvenile on two
28
different trials. A series of trials was completed in three days, 
each adult undergoing one trial per day.
Results
The means for investigation time in the second exposure are 
presented in Figure 1. A two way analysis of covariance ANCOVA 
(test type x first exposure duration) comparing the means of the 
investigation in the second exposure was used; investigation in 
the first three minutes of the first exposure was the covariate. 
There was a significant difference between the test trials and the 
control trials, F(l,59) = 27.57, p < 0.001. There was no main 
effect of first exposure length F(2,59) = 2.49, p = 0.111, nor of 
test order F(5,59) = 1.58, p = 0.195. There also was no 
significant interaction of first exposure length with test type 
F(2,59) = 1.61, p= 0.209. Though there was no significant 
interaction, after examining figure 1, I observed that there 
seemed to be two different patterns in the two test type groups. 
The data suggest that there was a great deal of variance in the 
control group. For these two reasons I decided to run a trend 
test on the two groups. There was a significant linear trend 
F(l,32) = 9.99, p = 0.0034 for the memory test group, but not for 
the control group F(l,32) = 0.10, p = 0.76. A post-hoc analysis 
using a Tukey's HSD revealed that in the memory test group there 
was a significant difference (alpha = 0.05) between the animals 
that received a three minute first exposure and those that 
received a seven minute first exposure.
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Discussion
Investigation in the second exposure was influenced by the 
duration allowed for investigation in the first exposure. As the 
amount of time in the first exposure increased, the adult 
performed less investigation in the second exposure in memory test 
trials, but not in investigation control trials. The trend of a 
reduced investigation in the second exposure in test trials was 
linear from three minutes to seven minutes. Since the levol 
of investigation is used as an index of the adult's memory of the 
juvenile, a reduced level investigation in the test trials when 
compared to the control trials is interpreted as memory (Thor and 
Holloway 1982.) These data, however, are not conclusive; even 
though there was no significant interaction, there was a 
significant linear trend in the test animals, but not in the 
control animals. In order to make solid a conclusion, the 
experiment should be replicated. The hypothesis, that first 
exposure length is analogous in this test to level of training in 
other memory tasks, for the moment seems to be true.
The five minute first exposure length was chosen for use in 
Experiment 2 because the level of investigation allowed for either 
an increase or decrease of investigation in the second exposure.
EXPERIMENT 2
Both state-dependent and context-dependent recall have been 
observed in humans and animals (Smith, Glenberg, and Bjork, 1978,
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Perkins and Weyant, 1958, Hill, Schwiu, Pov.ell, and Goodwin, 1973, 
Bliss, 1973). Context-dept ,Jent recall , been observed when the 
environment was changed between the training and the testing 
sessions. In lumans this change o environment can be as simple 
as a different room in the same building (Smith, Glenberg, and 
Bjork 1978). In rats this change of environment can be the 
changing of the color of a straight alley in which a rat has been 
trained to run (Perkins and Weyant, 1958).
State-dependent recall is observed when the subject's 
internal state is changed through drug administration. In humans 
this state change can be achieved through the use of many 
different drugs, including marijuana (Schwin, Powell, and 
Goodwin, 1973). In animals, a wider range of drugs has been 
observed to have a state-dependent influence, including 
pentobarbital (Bliss, 1973). In addition affect-dependent recall 
has been observed in humans (Bower, 1981), but affect-dependent 
recall has yet to be observed in animals. All three of these 
phenomena have very similar characteristics. The state, context, 
or affect, may influence the same condition that is important to 
memory processing. These condition-dependent recalls follow many 
of the same patterns, such as the strength of the condition 
influencing the "state-dependent effect" (Bliss, 1973) and the 
affect-dependent effect (Bower, 1981). If context-dependent, 
state-dependent, and affect-dependent recall are all the same
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phenomenon, then affect-dependent recall should be observable in 
animals.
In animals one of the easiest affects to induce and observe 
is fear (Archer, 1973). Fear can be induced in rats with a very 
mild footshock while they are in a large, brightly lit, open 
field. In contrast another affect that can be used is a feeling 
of ease. The rats can be made to feel safe by placing them in a 
small dimly lit arena. Rats seem to feel more comfortable in a 
small dark place than in a bright open arena (Archer, 1973). When 
paired with a mild footshock, the bright arena should become 
strongly associated with a feeling of unease, and the small dark 
arena, in contrast, will feel safe. The animals received 
conditioning trials so that they would associate the two arenas 
with the appropriate affects.
Method
Subjects
The subject animals were two groups of eight male Long Evans 
rats between 60 and 70 days of age, singly housed in clear plastic 
tubs (20cm x 20cm x 45cm). The stimulus animals were two groups of 
sixteen juvenile male Long Evans rats between 20 and 25 days of 
age housed in sibling pairs in the same size cages as the adults.
Apparatus
The testing was done in two different arenas under 
fluorescent lighting. The safe arena was a circular clear acrylic 
container with black paper on the outside of the walls and
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underneath the floor. The arena had a diameter of 39cm, and the 
walls were 30cm high. The unsafe arena was a large open field 
with a shock grid floor made of bars 2cm apart from center to 
center. The arena had dimensions of 60cm x 60cm x 60cm. with 
three white walls and one clear acrylic wall. Behavior was scored 
using an IBM AT and the Eventlog software.
Procedure
The same general procedure as in Experiment 1 was used in 
testing the animals for the adult’s memory of the juvenile.
There was a first exposure in either the safe or the unsafe arena, 
during which the adult was allowed to investigate the juvenile for 
five minutes. There was an interexposure interval during which 
the animals were returned to their home cages. There was a second 
exposure in either the safe or unsafe arena, during which the 
adult again was given the opportunity to investigate the juvenile 
for five minutes. In situations such as this, where the two 
conditions are either safe or unsafe, there are four different 
testing conditions necessary to if affect-dependent memory exists. 
The animals must be tested in a pairing of all four conditions: 
safe arena in the first exposure, safe arena in the second 
exposure (s/s); safe arena in the first exposure, unsafe arena in 
the second exposure (s/u); unsafe arena in the first exposure, 
safe arena in the second exposure (u/s); and unsafe in the first 
exposure, unsafe in the second exposure (u/u). Four different 
orderings of trials were used as determined by a Latin Square
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design (Keppel, 1982). Th fferent order series were: 1)
s/s, s/u, u/s, u/u 2) u/ >, u u/'i, s/s 3) s/u, u/u, s/s, u/s 4) 
u/s, s/s, u/u, s/u. Each an «i experienced only one trial per 
day.
Conditioning Procedure
The animals were assigned to one of four groups, and each 
group was run through that series of trials over four days, 
if an animal was in group one, on the first day he was placed in 
the safe arena for five minutes and allowed to explore. At the 
end of five minutes he was returned to his home cage.
The interexposure interval was twenty minutes long, at the end of 
which the adult was replaced in the safe arena and again allowed 
to explore. That completed the first day of training in the 
animal’s series. On the second day the same animal was placed in 
the safe arena for his first exposure, removed for the duration of 
the interexposure interval, and then placed in the unsafe arena 
for his second exposure. Wh’le in the unsafe arena the animal was 
likely at any time to receive a scrambled footshock of 0.5 
milliamps with a duration of 0.5 seconds. The animal's probability 
of receiving a footshock at any moment was determined 
by a Poisson distribution. The inter-shock interval was 30 
seconds. The series was then continued in the same manner as 
determined by the Latin Square design. The conditioning procedure 
took four days for each animal. A number of animals was run each
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day, with at least 4 animals being run on any one day. The animal 
received footshock only during condition trials.
Testing Procedure
The first day of testing immediately followed the last day of 
conditioning. The animals were tested in the same groups as they 
were conditioned except that these groups were subdivided into 
test and control animals. As described in Experiment 1, in 
a test trial the adult saw the same juvenile in both exposures. In 
a control trial the adult saw two different juveniles, who were 
cagemates, in the two exposures. Investigation was again recorded 
using the same criteria as in Experiment 1. The end result was 
two sets of eight series of trials matched across test and control 
groups.
Results
The means for investigation in the first exposure by arena 
type are presented in Figure 2. An ANOVA was performed comparing 
the means of investigation in the first exposure by arena type. 
There was no significant difference between investigation in the 
unsafe arena and the safe arena F(l,89) = 0.65, p = 0.42.
The means for defecation in the second exposure are presented 
in Figure 3. A two way analysis of covariance with trial day as 
the covariate revealed that there was no significant effect of 
test type on defecation F(8,82) = u.66, p = 0.41/. There was, 
however a significant effect of trial type on defecation F(8,82) = 
20.49, p = 0.0001. A post-hoc analysis using a Tukey HSD revealed
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that there was a significant difference (alpha = 0,05) in 
defecation in the second exposure between 1) the safe/safe and the 
safe/unsafe trials; 2) the safe/safe and the unsafe/unsafe trials; 
3) the safe/unsafe and the unsafe/safe trials; and 4) the 
unsafe/safe and tie unsafe/unsafe trials. There was no 
interaction of test type and trial type on defecation F(8,82) = 
0.10, p = 0.959.
The means for investigation in the second exposure are 
presented in Figure 4. A 2x2x2 analysis of variance (test type x 
arena type in the first exposure x arena type in the second 
exposure) revealed that there was a significant effect of test 
type F(28,62) = 16.84, p = 0.0033 on investigation in the second 
exposure. There was no significant effect of either the arena in 
the first exposure, F(28,62) = 2.32, p = 0.132, or the arena in 
the second exposure F(28,62) = 3.33, p = 0.072 on investigation in 
the second exposure. There was no significant interaction between 
test type and either the arena type in the first exposure F(28,62) 
= 0.15, p = 0.702 or the arena type in the second exposure 
F(28,62) = 0.00, p = 0.946. There was no significant interaction 
of arena type on the first exposure and arena type on the second 
exposure F(28,620) = 3.51, p = 0.065 on investigation on the 
second exposure. There also was no significant interaction of 
test type with arena type on the first exposure and arena type on 
the second exposure (test type x arena 1 x arena 2) F(28,62) = 
3.39, p = 0.070.
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Discussion
There was no s gnificant difference in investigation between 
the two arenas in the first exposure, despite the difference in 
affect observable by the difference in defecation (Archer, 1973). 
The animal's affect did not influence the level of investigation 
in the first exposure. Any difference in investigation in the 
second exposure in either the test or the control trials then is 
not attributable to how much investigating the adult did in the 
first exposure.
In the second exposure, the affect or the arena associated 
with the affect did not have a significant effect on investigation 
in the test trials as compared to the control trials, though the 
interaction was close to significant.
The evidence does not disprove or prove the hypothesis that 
affect-dependent recall exists in rats (p = 0.07). This failure 
to observe affect-dependent recall does not mean it does not exist 
in animals. There are a number of possible explanations as to why 
the state-dependent effect was not observed. These reasons 
include: 1) the adult's memory for the juvenile may have been very 
strong, either because of an effect similar to the one caused by a 
high level of training in a task, which would have masked the 
effect in the same manner as was observed in monkeys treated with 
pentobarbital (Bliss, 1973), or because test the situation for the 
rats may have been very special or memorable as was the case in 
the Schare et al (1984) study of affect-dependent recall in
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humans; 2) the states induced may not have been distinctive enough 
to cause an affect-dependent interaction; and 3) the measure of 
memory may not be sensitive enough to pick up any differences that 
already exist. There are simple ways to alter the methods of 
Experiment 2 to account for each of these possible problems.
If the adult's memory for the juvenile is too strong to be 
influenced by the affect manipulation there are three ways that 
could be used to weaken the adult's memory. The first method 
would involve the use of a longer interexposure interval.
The level of recall as measured by the adult's investigation of 
the juvenile decreases over time (Thor and Holloway, 1982).
The second method would be to shorten the first exposure length. 
The adult's memory for the juvenile is influenced by the amount of 
time he has to investigate in the first exposure (Experiment 1). 
The third method would be to introduce an interfering stimulus as 
was done by Bower et al (1978) and Schare et al. (1984). The use 
of an interfering stimulus, in the form of another juvenile, 
blocks or interferes with the adult's memory for the juvenile used 
in the first exposure (Thor and Holloway, 1982).
The methods discussed earlier may make affect-dependent 
recall observable in this task if the failure reported in this 
paper is due to the strength of the adult's memory and not due to 
a lack of distinctiveness in the induced affective states. There 
are a number of ways to change the methods used that may cause
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more distinctive affective states in the animal. One way would be 
to strengthen the conditioned affect to the unsafe arena.
A few possible methods to induce stronger negative affect would be 
to increase the intensity of the shock and/or the probability of 
receiving a shock. The shock stimuli may not have been aversive 
enough to induce a conditioned affect. Another method would be to 
increase the length of the conditioning period, because the 
animals may not have been given adequate opportunity to learn the 
associations to the two arenas. A more distinctive set of 
affective states may be induced by making the safe arena more than 
just safe, but the rodent equivalent of pleasurable. While in the 
unsafe arena the animals received stimuli that they disliked, 
while in the safe arena the animals by comparison, received no 
stimuli, they were just there and nothing happened. The 
difference between a fearful affect and a non-fearful affect may 
not be strong enough to allow the affect-dependent influence to be 
observed. The opportunity for special food or sweetened water 
while in the safe arena may induce a positive affect as opposed to 
an affect that may have been neutral. With these procedural 
changes a stronger interaction between affect and test type may be 
observed.
One alteration in methods that is necessary regardless of 
whether the strength of the affective states or the strength of 
the adult's memory need to be varied is the measure of memory 
used. The sensitivity of using a sum of investigation over the
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whole second exposure may be low. The change in affective states 
may not cause a change in the total amount of investigation in 
which the adult engages, but the different affective states may 
cause a change in the pattern of investigation in which the adult 
engages. A more sensitive measurement would be to look not only 
at total investigation time, but at the pattern of investigation 
in both the first and the second exposure. How and when the adult 
investigates the juvenile may be altered depending on his affect 
in either exposure or the order presentation of the two affects.
A significant observation of affect-dependent recall with 
these changes would not prove that affect-dependent recall exists 
in animals. What could be happening is the memory is just 
context-dependent. There are two other tests that would need to 
be performed to strengthen the hypothesis that affect-dep»,ndent 
recall exists in animals. Tne first would examine whether there 
is a affect-dependent effect operating on the memory using two 
arenas for each condition, two safe, two unsafe. The second test 
would examine whether there is a context-dependent effect 
operating on this memory. The first experiment would have a 
procedure similar to Experiment 2, which is described earlier in 
this paper. The variations are that the animal is conditioned to 
two arenas for each affect and the animal is tested under 
conditions of matching affect but not matching arenas. For 
example, in the safe/safe trials, after the appropriate 
conditioning trials, the adult would be placed in the first safe
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arena with the juvenile for the first exposure, removed for the 
interexposure interval and then placed in the second safe arena 
for the second exposure. If the memory levels in this experiment 
are comparable to a successful observation of affect-dependent 
recall, then it is quite possible that the original observation of 
affect-dependent recall, which has yet to occur, was not an effect 
of context, but of affect. This interpretation assumes that all 
affect inductions are effective, a problem that quite possibly may 
have prevented me from observing affect-dependent recall in 
Experiment 2. Whether or not this four-arena experiment is 
successful, the animals should be tested in the original arenas 
with no conditioning trials, to observe if the effect was context- 
dependent and not affect-dependent. To do either the fourth 
experiment or the third experiment without the other experiment 
would not provide conclusive results. A finding of the presence 
of a context-dependent effect does not preclude the presence of an 
affect-dependent effect. Nor does the finding of the lack of or 
the presence of a context-dependent effect prove that an original 
observation of affect-dependent recall was definitive. In the 
same manner, if only the third experiment were to be run an 
observation of affect-dependent recall would not prove that there 
was no contextual component, and an inconclusive finding of 
affect-dependent recall, without the results of the context 
experiment, would not address the question as to what is actually 
occurring in this situation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The findings from Experiment 1 suggest that investigation in 
the second exposure of the juvenile by the adult in memory test 
trials is influenced by the duration of the first exposure. This 
pattern of results could be compared to those observed in other 
tests of memory when level of training is examined. The findings 
of Experiment 2 are inconclusive and do not answer the question as 
to whether avfect-dependent recall exists in animals. The methods 
of the experiment require refinement and any results from improved 
methodology need to be foilo*-. d up with work examining the exact 
nature of the phenomenon. Follow up work is required whether or 
not a state-dependent effect is observed. If there is a state- 
dependent effect, then the question to be pursued is whether this 
is context- or affect-dependent recall; and if no state-dependent 
effect is observed, the question to be pursued is why no context- 
dependent effect was observed when less dramatic changes in 
environment in the Perkins and Weyant (1958) study caused a 
context-dependent effect
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